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Abstract
Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) extend standard fault trees
by allowing the modeling of complex system components’
behaviors and interactions. Being a high level model and
easy to use, DFT are experiencing a growing success among
reliability engineers. Unfortunately, a number of issues still
remains when using DFT. Briefly, these issues are (1) a lack
of formality (syntax and semantics), (2) limitations in mod-
ular analysis and thus vulnerability to the state-space ex-
plosion problem, and (3) lack in modular model-building.
We use the input/output interactive Markov chain (I/O-IMC)
formalism to analyse DFT. I/O-IMC have a precise seman-
tics and are an extension of continuous-time Markov chains
with input and output actions. In this paper, using the I/O-
IMC framework, we address and resolve issues (2) and (3)
mentioned above. We also show, through some examples,
how one can readily extend the DFT modeling capabilities
using the I/O-IMC framework.
KEYWORDS: Fault tree, Interactive process, Markov
chain, compositional aggregation, modularity.
1. Introduction
Dynamic fault trees (DFT) [10, 7, 19] extend stan-
dard (or static) fault trees (FT) [20] by defining additional
gates called dynamic gates. These gates allow the model-
ing of complex system components’ behaviors and inter-
actions which is far superior to the modeling capabilities
∗This research has been partially funded by the Netherlands Or-
ganisation for Scientific Research (NWO) under FOCUS/BRICKS grant
number 642.000.505 (MOQS); the EU under grant number IST-004527
(ARTIST2); and by the DFG/NWO bilateral cooperation programme un-
der project number DN 62-600 (VOSS2).
†The majority of this work was done while the author was at the Uni-
versity of Twente.
of standard FT. Like standard FT, dynamic fault trees are
a high-level formalism for computing reliability measures
of computer-based systems, such as the probability that the
system fails during its mission time. For over a decade now,
DFT have been experiencing a growing success among re-
liability engineers. Unfortunately, a number of issues still
remains when using DFT. Most notably the following three
issues are a matter of concern: (1) the DFT semantics is
rather imprecise and the lack of formality has, in some
cases, led to undefined behavior and misinterpretation of
the DFT model. (2) DFT lack modular analysis. That is,
even though stochastically-independent sub-modules exist
in a certain DFT module (specifically those whose top-node
is a dynamic gate), these sub-modules cannot be solved
separately and still get an exact solution. Consequently, a
DFT model, which is typically analyzed by first convert-
ing it into a Markov chain (MC), becomes vulnerable to the
state space explosion problem. (3) DFT also lack modular
model-building, i.e. there are some rather severe restrictions
on the type of allowed inputs to certain gates (e.g. inputs to
spare gates and dependent events of functional dependency
gates have to be basic events), which greatly diminish the
modeling flexibility and power of DFT.
DFT are comprised of various elements1: Basic events,
static gates (AND, OR, and K/M gates), and dynamic gates
(functional dependency, priority AND, and spare gates).
Each of these elements is viewed as a process moving from
one state to another. States denote either the operation or
the failure of the element. Each element, or process, also
interacts (communicates) with its environment by respond-
ing to certain input signals and producing output signals.
These elements2 could also possess a purely stochastic be-
havior by allowing (in a probabilistic fashion) the passage
of time prior to moving to another state. In the remainder
1Also called components.
2At this point only the basic events.
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of the paper, we assume this passage of time to be governed
by an exponential probability distribution (thus behaving as
a Markovian process). Moving from one state to another is
therefore caused by either an input or output transition or
due to a Markovian transition.
Given the nature of DFT elements we have used the in-
put/output interactive Markov chain (I/O-IMC) formalism
[4] to model the semantics of DFT. In fact, I/O-IMC aug-
ment continuous-time Markov chains with input and out-
put actions and a clear separation between Markovian tran-
sitions and interactive (involving input or output actions)
transitions is made. Furthermore, I/O-IMC have a precise
and formal semantics and have proved to be a suitable and
natural way to model DFT elements.
I/O-IMC are an example of a stochastic extension to a
process algebra. These stochastic process algebras have re-
cently gained popularity in performance modeling and anal-
ysis due to their compositional aggregation approach. We
refer the reader to [14] for case studies on the application
of the compositional aggregation approach to the model-
ing and analysis of real systems. Compositional aggrega-
tion is a technique to build an I/O-IMC by composing, in
successive iterations, a number of elementary and smaller
I/O-IMC and reducing (i.e. aggregating) the state-space of
the generated I/O-IMC as the composition takes place (cf.
Section 3).
Issue (1), mentioned above, has been addressed in [4]
where a formal syntax and semantics for DFT have been
defined. The formal syntax is derived by characterizing the
DFT as a directed acyclic graph. The formal DFT semantics
is described in terms of I/O-IMC, and provides a rigorous
basis for the analysis of DFT. In fact, each DFT element
has a corresponding elementary I/O-IMC. This semantics
is fully compositional, that is, the semantics of a DFT is
expressed in terms of the semantics of its elements. This
enables an efficient analysis of DFT through compositional
aggregation to produce a single I/O-IMC, on which we can
then carry out performance analysis. Earlier work on for-
malizing DFT can be found in [8], where DFT are specified
using the Z formal specification language. The main differ-
ence between the formal specification in [8] and the formal
specification used in this paper is that in our framework we
use a process algebra-like formalism (i.e. I/O-IMC) which
allows us to use the well-defined concept of compositional
aggregation which helps us to combat the state-space ex-
plosion problem. In fact, this notion of compositional ag-
gregation is not present in [8] and the state-space explosion
problem is not addressed or mitigated whatsoever.
We address issue (2) by showing, using the I/O-IMC
framework, how the DFT analysis becomes greatly mod-
ular compared to current state of the art DFT analysis tech-
niques. In particular, we demonstrate, through an example
system, how an I/O-IMC corresponding to a certain (inde-
pendent) dynamic module3 can be reused in any larger DFT
model.
We also tackle issue (3) and lift two previously enforced
restrictions on DFT; namely, the restriction on spares and
functional dependency gates’ dependent events to be basic
events. In fact, in our framework it becomes possible to,
for instance, model a spare as a complex sub-system com-
prised of several basic events and gates. The use of (shared)
spares in DFT has always been somehow problematic [8].
In this paper, we carefully examine, clarify, and generalize
the concept of spare activation.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
1. Illustrate, through a case study, the use of the I/O-IMC
framework for the analysis of DFT, and in particular
we show the benefits of the compositional aggregation
approach.
2. Show the increased DFT modular analysis and the con-
cept of reuse of dynamic modules.
3. Extend the DFT modeling capabilities by allowing
complex spares (through the generalization of the con-
cept of activation) and complex functionally dependent
events.
4. Illustrate how readily one can define new DFT ele-
ments and provide 3 examples.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2 and Section 3, we introduce DFT and I/O-IMC
respectively. In Section 4, we show how a DFT is auto-
matically converted into a community of I/O-IMC and dis-
cuss non-determinism. In Section 5, we illustrate the DFT
modular analysis. In Section 6, we lift the restrictions on
the spare and functional dependency (FDEP) gates. Finally,
in Section 7, we illustrate how one can readily extend the
modeling capabilities of DFT by augmenting or modifying
the set of elementary I/O-IMC models. Some of these ex-
tensions include mutually exclusive events and repair. We
conclude the paper and suggest future work in Section 8.
2. Dynamic fault trees
A fault tree model describes the system failure in terms
of the failure of its components. Standard FT are combi-
natorial models and are built using static gates (the AND,
the OR, and the K/M gates) and basic events (BE). A com-
binatorial model only captures the combination of events
and not the order of their occurrence. Combinatorial mod-
els become, therefore, inadequate to model today’s complex
dynamic systems. DFT introduce three novel modeling ca-
pabilities: (1) spare component management and allocation,
3Also called sub-system or sub-tree.
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(2) functional dependency, and (3) failure sequence depen-
dency. These modeling capabilities are realized using three
main dynamic gates4: The spare gate, the functional de-
pendency (FDEP) gate, and the priority AND (PAND) gate.
Figure 1 depicts the three dynamic gates.
The PAND gate fails when all its inputs fail and fail from
left to right (as depicted on the figure) order. The spare gate
has one primary input and one or more alternate inputs (i.e.
the spares). The primary input is initially powered on and
when it fails, it is replaced by an alternate input. The spare
gate fails when the primary and all the alternate inputs fail
(or are unavailable). A spare could also be shared among
multiple spare gates. In this configuration, when a spare
is taken by a spare gate, it becomes unavailable (i.e. essen-
tially seen as failed) to the rest of the spare gates. The FDEP
gate is comprised of a trigger event and a set of depen-
dent components. When the trigger event occurs, it causes
the dependent components to become inaccessible or unus-
able (i.e. essentially failed). The FDEP gate’s output is a
‘dummy’ output (i.e. it is not taken into account during the
calculation of the system’s failure probability). Along with
Output
Inputs
SPARE GATE
Spares
FDEP
Trigger
event
Dependent
eventsPrimary
Dummy
outputOutput
(a) (c)(b)
Figure 1. Dynamic gates: (a) PAND, (b) spare, (c) FDEP.
static and dynamic gates, DFT also possess basic events,
which are leaves of the tree. A basic event usually repre-
sents a physical component having a certain failure proba-
bility distribution (e.g. exponential). A DFT element has
a number of operational or failed states. In the case of a
BE5, operational states could be further classified as dor-
mant or active states. A dormant state is a state where the
BE failure rate is reduced by a factor called the dormancy
factor α. An active state is a state where the BE failure rate
λ is unchanged. Depending on the value of α, we classify
BE as: cold BE (α = 0), hot BE (α = 1), and warm BE
(0 < α < 1). The dormant and active states of a BE cor-
respond to dormant and active modes of the physical com-
ponent. For instance, a spare tire of a car is initially in a
dormant mode and switches to an active mode when it is
fixed on the car for use.
4A fourth gate called ‘Sequence Enforcing’ gate has also been defined
in [10]; however, it turns out that this gate can be emulated using a cold
spare gate.
5Also a spare gate as we will see in Section 6.
Galileo DIFTree [11] was the first package to introduce,
use, and analyze DFT. DIFTree uses a modular approach
to analyze a DFT. Indeed, the DFT is first split into inde-
pendent static and dynamic modules, the modules are then
solved separately and each of them is replaced by a BE with
a constant failure probability. The modules’ solutions are
then combined to find the overall system reliability. This
process is iterative as independent modules could be nested.
An independent module is dynamic if it contains at least
one dynamic gate, otherwise it is static. Static modules are
solved using binary decision diagrams and dynamic mod-
ules are solved by converting them into Markov chains.
Note that when an independent module is replaced by
a BE with a constant failure probability, some information
(i.e. the shape) of the module’s failure distribution is lost
since it is replaced by a single failure probability value.
Moreover, since any dynamic gate requires the knowledge
of the entire failure probability density functions of their in-
puts, solving an independent module and replacing it by a
BE with a constant failure probability is only possible if the
module is part of a larger static (and not dynamic) module.
This constraint, which is linked to issue (2) mentioned in the
Introduction, makes DFT far less modular (cf. Section 5).
3. Input/output interactive Markov chains
Input/output interactive Markov chains [4] are an in-
tegration of input/output automata [16] and CTMC [15,
18]. I/O-IMC are closely related to Interactive Markov
Chains [12] (IMC) which are an integration of interactive
processes [17] and CTMC.
Figure 2.a shows two examples of input/output interac-
tive Markov chains. Circles denote states in the model and
transitions are depicted as arrows. The starting state is iden-
tified by a black dot. There are two different kinds of transi-
tions in an I/O-IMC model: Markovian transitions, denoted
by a small rectangle on the arrow and interactive transi-
tions, denoted by a line on the arrow. Each I/O-IMC has
an action signature, written next to its starting state, which
shows how it communicates with the environment. I/O-
IMC B, for instance, has an input action a?, an output ac-
tion b! and no internal actions. When each of the I/O-IMC’s
actions has at least one associated transition, the action sig-
nature can be (and often is) omitted. The difference between
inputs, outputs and internal actions will be discussed later in
this section.
I/O-IMC B has a Markovian transition from state 1 to
state 2. This transition has a rate of λ. Markovian transi-
tions in I/O-IMC behave exactly the same way as Marko-
vian transitions in CTMC: the I/O-IMC moves from state
1 to state 2 after an exponentially distributed delay. An
I/O-IMC with only Markovian transitions can thus be in-
terpreted as a CTMC. I/O-IMC B also has an interactive
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transition from state 1 to state 3 labeled a?. This denotes
that the move from 1 to 3 is an input action named a. Input
actions are denoted with a question mark (i.e. a?). If some
other I/O-IMC performs an output action named a while
I/O-IMC B is in state 1 then B will move to state 3 imme-
diately. It is important to note that every state of I/O-IMC B
has an outgoing input transition named a. This means that
B is always ready to respond to an output-action a, even if
this does not result in a state-change (when B is in state 3,
4, or 5). For clarity we will omit these transitions (input-
actions from a state to itself) from now on. We say that I/O-
IMC B is input-enabled with respect to action a. Note that
input actions are delayable, i.e. they must wait until another
I/O-IMC performs the corresponding output-action.
A different kind of interactive transition from state 4 to
state 5 is also present in B. This transition is labeled b! and
is an output action. Output actions are denoted with an ex-
clamation mark (i.e. b!). When I/O-IMC B performs this
output action all I/O-IMC which have b as an input action
must perform this input action. Unlike input actions, output
actions are immediate; i.e. when I/O-IMC B moves to state
4 no time passes before it moves to state 5. It is however
possible that another interactive transition is taken immedi-
ately. Specifically, if two or more different output actions
are possible in a state, then the choice between the transi-
tions is non-deterministic. One of the transitions is taken
immediately, but it is not known how this choice is made.
b!
2
4 5
3
a?
a?
a?
b!
-
B 1
a!
2 3
-
a!
-
A 1
b!
3,4 3,5
-
b!
a;
1,1
a?
a?
a?
1,2
2,2
2,1
-
b!
a;
b!
3,4 3,5
3,3
a;
a;
1,1
(a) Two examples of I/O-IMC
(b) Parallel composition of A and B, 
hiding signal a (‘Hide a in A||B’)
(c) Aggregation of ‘Hide a in A||B’
Figure 2. Composition, hiding, and aggregation.
Besides input and output actions there are also internal
actions. Internal actions are denoted with a semi-colon (;)
and model internal computation steps of the system they
represent. Thus, internal actions do not influence other I/O-
IMC and are not influenced by other I/O-IMC. Similar to
output actions, internal actions are immediate.
The reason it is interesting to combine Markovian and
interactive transitions is that interactive transitions enable
the construction of large I/O-IMC by composition of sev-
eral smaller I/O-IMC [12]. The subject at hand (the analysis
of dynamic fault trees) is a good example. Instead of trans-
forming the entire DFT into one large CTMC we transform
the basic events and gates of the DFT first and then cre-
ate a single I/O-IMC by combining the smaller ones (see
Section 5). The I/O-IMC formalism is one such approach
to combining Markovian and interactive transitions. A dis-
cussion on different approaches to combining Markovian
and interactive transitions in one formalism can be found
in [12]. An I/O-IMC can also be transformed into a smaller
aggregated I/O-IMC that is equivalent (i.e. preserving the
system reliability measure) to the original I/O-IMC. This
state space aggregation, which generalizes the notion of
lumping in CTMC, can very effectively reduce the resources
necessary to create a model of a real-life system [14]. In this
work we have used weak bisimulation to aggregate the I/O-
IMC. For the definition of weak bisimulation for I/O-IMC
we refer the reader to [4] and for details on the complexity
of the minimization algorithm we refer to [12]. Figure 2
shows an example of how two I/O-IMC A and B can be
composed (and hiding signal a with which they commu-
nicate) and how the resulting I/O-IMC can then be aggre-
gated. When composing I/O-IMC A and B we synchronize
on signal a, because it is in both their action signatures.
Since B has a as an input, it has to wait for A’s output
action a!. This explains the absence of an input transition
a? from state (1, 1) in the composed model. However, in
state (2, 1), for instance, A outputs its signal a (and moves
to state 3) and B simultaneously makes the corresponding
input transition and moves from state 1 to 3. All Marko-
vian transitions and non-synchronizing signals are essen-
tially interleaved during composition. Since weak bisim-
ulation abstracts from internal (unobserved) actions; states
(1,2), (2,1), (2,2), and (3,3) are equivalent given that they
essentially all move with a rate λ to the same state (3,4). In-
deed, these 4 states are aggregated into a single (unlabeled)
state in Figure 2.c.
4. DFT to I/O-IMC conversion
During the conversion of a DFT to a MC, the DIFTree al-
gorithm [11] proceeds as follow: First, the MC’s initial state
is created, listing the states of all basic events contained in
the DFT as operational 6. From the initial state, every BE
is being failed (according to its failure rate) one at a time
and the corresponding transition and next state are created
where the state information (i.e. operational or failed) of
the basic event is updated. For every newly created state,
the DFT model (i.e. system state) is evaluated to determine
whether the state corresponds to an operational or a failed
system state7. As long as a state is an operational state, ev-
ery operational BE contained in that state is being failed,
and a corresponding new transition (and optionally a new
state) is created. Note that each MC state has a vector list-
6Some extra information, such as which spare gate is using a given
spare, is also appended to the state.
7This operation is unnecessary in the I/O-IMC framework.
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ing the state of all basic events contained in the DFT; conse-
quently, this makes the state-space grow exponentially with
the number of basic events.
This DIFTree MC generation approach, where the model
of a dynamic system is generated at once and as a whole,
is to be contrasted with our compositional aggregation ap-
proach. paper In our I/O-IMC framework, each DFT ele-
ment (i.e. basic event and gates) has a corresponding I/O-
IMC precisely defining its behavior (i.e. semantics). Every
I/O-IMC has an initial operational state (i.e. with no incom-
ing transition), some intermediate operational (dormant or
active) states, a firing (i.e. about to output a failure sig-
nal) state, and an absorbing fired state. The firing and fired
states are both failed states and are drawn as gray circles
and double circles respectively. There are two main signals
(or actions): a firing signal and an activation signal. The
firing signal of element A is denoted by fA and it signals
the failure of a BE or a gate. The activation signal refers to
the activation (i.e. switching from dormant to active mode)
of a spare A and is denoted by aA. An activation signal
is only output by spare gates, and aA,B denotes the activa-
tion of spare A by spare gate B. Indeed, since a spare A
can be shared, and thus activated, by multiple spare gates,
an activation signal is needed for each of the spare gates.
These activation signals are then translated by an auxiliary
I/O-IMC model8 called activation auxiliary (AA) into a sin-
gle activation signal aA which acts as an input to the spare
A. In the original DIFTree methodology, only BE can act
as spares, and thus BE are the only elements that exhibit
a dormant as well as an active behavior. However, in our
framework we lift this restriction by allowing any indepen-
dent sub-system to act as a spare. As a consequence, spare
gates also exhibit dormant and active behaviors (see Sec-
tion 6 for further details).
In the following, we show the I/O-IMC of the basic
event, the PAND gate, the FDEP gate, and the spare gate
(the full details on all the gates can be found in [4]). We
postpone the discussion on the spare gate model until Sec-
tion 6.
4.1. Basic event I/O-IMC model
As pointed out in Section 2, a basic event has a differ-
ent failing behavior depending on its dormancy factor. For
this reason we identify three types of basic events and corre-
spondingly three types of I/O-IMC. Figure 3 shows the I/O-
IMC corresponding to a cold, warm, and hot basic events
(all called A). The I/O-IMC clearly captures the behavior
of the basic event described in Section 2.
8The AA model is essentially an OR gate having as inputs the various
activations signals coming from the spare gates, and as an output a spare
activation signal rather than a firing signal.
fA!
aA?
fA!
aA?
·
fA!
aA?
Figure 3. I/O-IMC models of cold, warm, and hot BE.
4.2. PAND gate I/O-IMC model
The PAND gate fires if all its inputs fail and fail from
left to right order. If the inputs fire in the wrong order,
the PAND gate moves to an operational absorbing state (de-
noted with an X on Figure 4). Figure 4 shows the I/O-IMC
fP!
fA? fB?
fB?
fA fB
fP
Figure 4. I/O-IMC of the PAND gate.
of the PAND gate P with two inputs A and B (A being the
leftmost input).
4.3. FDEP gate I/O-IMC model
A functional dependency is modeled using a firing auxil-
iary (FA). The FA governs when a dependent DFT element
fires, i.e. either when the element fails by itself or when its
failure is triggered by the FDEP gate trigger. There exists a
different FA for each dependent event. Figure 5 shows the
FA of element A, which is functionally dependent upon B.
The signal f∗A corresponds to the failure of element A by
itself without factoring in its functional dependency (i.e. in
isolation), and the signal fA corresponds to the failure of A
when also considering its functional dependency upon B.
In order to get the correct behavior of the element A, one
has to compose the three I/O-IMC corresponding to A in
isolation, to its FA, and to the trigger B. Note that any ele-
ment which has A as input has to now interface with A’s FA
rather than directly with A. Note also that the firing auxil-
fA!
f*A?
fB?
FDEP
B
A
Figure 5. I/O-IMC of the firing auxiliary.
iary I/O-IMC is similar to the OR gate I/O-IMC with two
input signals f∗A and fA.
In the original DIFTree methodology, only BE can be
dependent events. However, in our framework we lift this
restriction by allowing any sub-system to be an FDEP gate
dependent event (Section 6).
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The I/O-IMC models discussed above have been gener-
alized (cf. [9] for details) to deal with any number of inputs.
4.4. Simultaneity and non-determinism
In earlier development of the DFT modeling formalism,
the semantics (i.e. the model interpretation) of some DFT
configurations where FDEP gates are used remained un-
clear. For instance, in Figure 6, the FDEP gate triggers (in
both configurations) the failures of two basic events. Does
this mean that the dependent events fail simultaneously and,
if so, what is the state of the PAND gate (in configuration
a) and which spare gate gets the shared spare S (in config-
uration b)? These examples were also discussed in [8], and
we believe that this is an inherent non-determinism in these
models. In [8], these special cases are dealt with by system-
atically removing the non-determinism by transforming it
into a probabilistic (or deterministic) choice. In our frame-
work, we allow non-determinism and naturally provide a
mechanism for detecting it should this arise in a particu-
lar DFT configuration. Moreover, if the non-determinism
was not intended, then its detection indicates that an error
occurred during the model specification. Non-determinism
could also be an inherent characteristic of the system being
analyzed, and should therefore be explicitly modeled. An
example of such a system would be a repairman following
a first failed first repaired policy and being in charge of two
components. Now, if both components fail at the same time,
then we might decide to model the choice of which one to
pick first for repair to be a non-deterministic choice made
by the repairman.
In the I/O-IMC formalism, the DFT configurations de-
picted in Figure 6 will be interpreted as follows: Whenever
the dependent events failure has been triggered, then the
trigger event (the cause) happened first and was then im-
mediately (with no time elapsing) followed by the failure of
the dependent events (the effect). This adheres to the clas-
sical notion of causality. Moreover, the dependent events
FDEP
AT B
SPARE GATE
WSP
SPARE GATE
WSP
S
FDEP
T BA
(a) (b)
Figure 6. The occurrence of non-determinism.
fail in a non-deterministic order (i.e. essentially consider
all combinations of ordering). In this case, the final I/O-
IMC model is not a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC)
but rather a continuous-time Markov decision process (CT-
MDP), which can be analysed by computing bounds of the
performance measure of interest (see [2] for an efficient al-
gorithm on analysing CTMDP).
4.5. Conversion of a DFT into a community
of I/O-IMC
We have defined the individual I/O-IMC models for each
of the DFT elements and some were described in the pre-
vious sub-sections. We can now convert any given DFT
into a corresponding set of I/O-IMC models. Moreover, we
need to match the inputs and outputs of all the models. The
mapping between the DFT and the I/O-IMC community is
a one-to-one mapping, except for some cases (e.g. spare ac-
tivation and functional dependency) where extra auxiliary
I/O-IMC are also used.
5. DFT analysis
Once the DFT has been converted into an I/O-IMC com-
munity, the compositional aggregation methodology can be
applied on the I/O-IMC community to reduce the com-
munity to a single I/O-IMC. The final I/O-IMC reduces
in many cases to a CTMC9. This CTMC can be then
solved using standard methods [18] to compute perfor-
mance measures such as system unreliability. The full con-
version/analysis algorithm10 is as follows:
1. Map each DFT element to its corresponding (aggre-
gated) I/O-IMC and match all inputs and outputs. The
result of this step is an I/O-IMC community.
2. Pick two I/O-IMC and parallel compose them.
3. Hide output signals that won’t be subsequently used
(i.e. synchronized on).
4. Aggregate (using weak bisimulation as mentioned in
Section 3) the I/O-IMC obtained from the composition
of the two I/O-IMC picked in Step 2 and the hiding of
the output signals in Step 3.
5. Go to Step 2 if more than 1 I/O-IMC is left, otherwise
go to Step 6.
6. Analyse the aggregated CTMC (or CTMDP).
5.1. Example: The cardiac assist system
The cardiac assist system (CAS) model is taken from
[3] and is based on a real system. The DFT is shown in
Figure 7. The CAS consists of three separate and distinct
modules: The CPU unit, the motor unit and the pump unit.
9Occasionally to a CTMDP if some non-determinism remains.
10Note that this algorithm is amenable to parallelization.
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Motor_unit
system
Trigger MP
Pump_unitCPU_fdep CPU_unit
Motors Pump_A Pump_B
CS SS
P B
MS MA MB PA PS PB
Figure 7. The cardiac assist system DFT.
There are two CPUs: a primary (P, λ = 0.5) and a warm
spare (B, λ = 0.5) with α = 0.5. Both are functionally
dependent on a cross switch (CS, λ = 0.2) and a system
supervision (SS, λ = 0.2), which means that the failure
of either these components will trigger the failure of both
CPUs. There are also two motors: a primary (MA, λ = 1)
and a cold spare (MB, λ = 1). The switching component
(MS, λ = 0.01) turns on the spare motor when the primary
fails. The MS is also subject to failure, but this failure is
only relevant if it occurs before the failure of the primary
motor. Finally, there are three pumps: two primary pumps
(PA and PB with λ = 1 for both) running in parallel and a
cold shared spare pump (PS, λ = 1). All three pumps must
fail for the pump unit to fail.
We have developed our own conversion tool which takes
as input a DFT specified in the Galileo DFT format [11],
and translates the DFT into its corresponding community of
I/O-IMC models in the format of the TIPP tool [13]. The
I/O-IMC models are then composed and aggregated using
the TIPP tool. Finally, the system unreliability is computed
also using the TIPP tool. Each of the aggregated I/O-IMC
models of the three modules had 6 states. This result was
comparable to the Galileo tool results, where the biggest
generated CTMC (the pump unit) had 8 states. The system
unreliability obtained using the TIPP tool was 0.6579 for a
mission time equals to 1 time unit. The result provided by
the Galileo DIFTree tool was identical. In the next section,
we show, through a second example, the enhanced modular
analysis that we attain using the I/O-IMC framework.
5.2. Modular analysis
In this section, we illustrate the lack of modularity (al-
ready pointed out in [1, 5] and which leads to a worsening of
the state-space explosion problem) in the DIFTree method-
ology with respect to dynamic modules. The example at
hand, shown in Figure 8, is called the cascaded PAND sys-
tem (CPS) for which a variation can be found in [5]. The
CPS consists of two PAND gates and three AND gates each
having four identical BE with a failure rate equals to 1. In
fact, the three AND gates constitute independent and identi-
system
BA
DC
Figure 8. The cascaded PAND system.
cal modules. However, since the top gate is a dynamic gate,
the DIFTree methodology does not modularize the tree into
five11 distinct modules; but it rather considers the whole tree
as a single module. The reason that DIFTree does not con-
sider, for instance, module A as an independent module is
because its parent gate (i.e. the PAND gate System) is a
dynamic gate (cf. Section 2).
Thanks to the interactivity of I/O-IMC, we are able to
further modularize the CPS and generate the correspond-
ing I/O-IMC for each of the five modules. Moreover, since
A, C, and D are identical, we only need to generate the
I/O-IMC for one of these modules and reuse it by renaming
some of the activation and firing signals. Figure 9 shows the
I/O-IMC of module A after parallel composition and aggre-
gation. The I/O-IMC is particularly small because all basic
events have the same failure rate and the order in which
they fail is irrelevant. Solving the CPS following this mod-
fA!aA?
Figure 9. I/O-IMC of module A.
ular compositional aggregation analysis technique resulted
in 156 states and 490 transitions for the biggest generated
I/O-IMC. This result is to be contrasted with the DIFTree
solution which resulted in 4113 states and 24608 transi-
tions. The system unreliability, for a mission time equals
to 1 time unit, is the same in both cases and equals 0.00135.
The reason DIFTree performs so poorly is because the cor-
responding CTMC is generated for the whole tree (i.e. with
12 basic events) and at once, and in which even irrelevant
failure orders (such as for the BE belonging to module A)
are accounted for. The compositional aggregation approach
performs particularly well for this example due to the high
modularity of the system. However, the approach does not
perform as well for some examples we have worked on
where the DFT elements are highly connected (i.e. numer-
ous interdependencies/interactions between DFT elements),
which leads to the incapacity to effectively divide the sys-
tem into independent small modules.
11Each gate acts as an independent module.
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6. Modular model-building
Static fault trees are highly modular, i.e., any sub-tree
can be used as an input to another static gate. Unfortunately,
this modularity does not currently apply to dynamic trees.
Indeed, only BE are allowed as inputs to spare gates and
as dependent events of FDEP gates. In the I/O-IMC frame-
work, we increase the modularity of DFT by allowing: (1)
independent sub-trees to act as primary and spare compo-
nents and (2) FDEP gates to trigger any arbitrary element
(BE and gates).
This section and the CPS example of the previous sec-
tion show the enhanced modularity obtained in our frame-
work and the ability to reuse, without restrictions, indepen-
dent sub-modules within larger dynamic modules. Such
reusability, which was previously only fully implementable
in static FT, is a very powerful and useful concept in large
FT. Indeed, being able to ‘plug-in’ modules is a practical
feature when designing very large systems where the model
is build incrementally and/or various teams are working on
different parts of the system.
6.1. Spare modules extension
The system depicted in Figure 10.a is a typical system
we would like to be able to model using the DFT formal-
ism. The primary and spare components are not BE, but
rather more complex sub-systems. In the I/O-IMC frame-
work, we allow primary and spare components to be any
independent sub-system12. We enforce the independence
restriction because otherwise the activation of these compo-
nents becomes unclear.
This extension of primary and spare components re-
quires the reexamination of the concept of activation. The
intuition is as follows: In Figure 10.a, the activation of mod-
ule ‘spare’ simply means the activation of the two BE C and
D. The module’s (represented by its top-node AND gate)
dormancy is defined by the dormancy of its BE. The AND
gate I/O-IMC model is not changed and has the same behav-
ior whether ‘spare’ is dormant or active. In fact, whenever
an activation signal is received by module ‘spare’, this same
activation signal is simply passed on to the next components
(which happen to be BE in this example), one level down the
tree. The behavior of all the gates (i.e. I/O-IMC models) is
unchanged whether they are used as spares or not. However,
the spare gate is an exception to this rule and does behave
differently when used as a spare. Figure 10.b illustrates this:
When ‘spare’ is not activated (i.e. ‘primary’ has not failed),
BE C and D are dormant; and even if C (being a warm
12A sub-system is usually named after its top-node and is independent
if (1) all the elements in the tree have inputs from only elements within the
same tree and (2) all the outputs, except for the top-node, are also within
the tree and therefore hidden to the rest of the system
SPARE GATE
WSP
system SPARE GATE
WSP
system
primary
A B
spare
C D
SPARE GATE
WSP
primary
A B
SPARE GATE
WSP
spare
C D
FDEP
T A
B C
system
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 10. Complex spares and FDEP gate extension.
spare) fails, D remains dormant. This is the same behavior
as with the ‘spare’ AND gate in Figure 10.a. If ‘spare’ is
activated, the activation signal is only passed to the primary
C and D remains dormant (this is clearly different from the
AND gate where both BE are activated). Should C fail and
‘spare’ being in its active state, then D is activated. Based
on the above explanation, Figure 11 shows the behavior of
the spare gate A13. Signals aS,A and aS,C are actions out-
CA
P S
fP? fS?
fS? fP?
aS,C?
fA!
fP? fS?
fP? fP?
aS,C?
aS,C?
aA?
aA?
aA?
aS,C?aS,A!
fS?
Figure 11. The spare gate I/O-IMC model.
put respectively by A and C signaling that the spare S has
been taken14. The spare gate I/O-IMC model has been, of
course, generalized to handle multiple spare gates sharing
multiple spares (i.e. the most general case).
6.2. FDEP gate extension
In this framework, the FDEP gate can trigger the failure
of any gate (representing a sub-system) and not only BE.
Indeed, this extension comes at no extra cost, and the I/O-
IMC used in this case is still the same as the one shown in
Figure 5. Figure 10.c shows such a configuration where T
triggers the failure of the sub-tree A. Note that sub-system
A does not need to be an independent module. Note also
that the trigger T only affects the failure of the gate A and
none of its elements below it such as the basic event C.
13For clarity, the activation signal is drawn as a dashed line.
14This solution is not very scalable since it suggests that all spare gates
sharing a spare communicate with each other. A better solution has been
found where a ‘spare granting’ auxiliary is used.
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7. DFT elements extension
In this section, we show, through some examples, how
readily one can extend the DFT elements within the I/O-
IMC framework. In fact, adding/modifying elements is
done at the level of the elementary I/O-IMC models. More-
over, adding/modifying one element does not affect the re-
mainder of the elements (i.e. their corresponding I/O-IMC
models). This is indeed a desirable property of the I/O-IMC
framework, where the behavioral details and interactions of
any element is kept as local as possible. These extensions
only affect Step 1 of the DFT conversion/analysis algorithm
laid out in Section 5. The remaining five steps, including
the composition, the aggregation and the analysis remain
unchanged. The first extension concerns the modeling of
inhibition and mutually exclusive events. The second exten-
sion is somewhat more involved and concerns the modeling
of repair.
7.1. Inhibition and mutual exclusivity
We say that event A inhibits the failure of B if the fail-
ure of B is prevented when A fails before B. Following
the idea of the firing auxiliary (cf. Section 4.3), this could
be modeled by simply adding an inhibition auxiliary (IA).
Figure 12 shows the configuration of such inhibition and
the corresponding I/O-IMC model of the IA of B. Signal
f∗B corresponds to the failure signal of B taken in isolation,
i.e. without A’s inhibition. Note that, as with the FA, any
element which has B as input has to now interface with B’s
IA rather than directly with B.
fB!fB*?
fA?
IAB
BA
fA fB*
fB
Figure 12. The I/O-IMC model of the IA.
If event B also inhibits the failure of A, then we need
to add an IA for A as well. In this way, the failure of A
and the failure of B become two mutually exclusive events.
Mutual exclusivity is very useful when modeling a compo-
nent exhibiting various failure modes. A typical example
is a switch with two failure modes: ‘failing to close’ and
‘failing to open’. These failures have normally different
probabilities of occurrence and different consequences on
the overall system. The switch failure modes have to be
modeled as two mutually exclusive BE since the switch can
either fail open or fail closed, but not both.
7.2. Repair
Adding a notion of repair is somewhat more complicated
as every DFT element can now fail or be repaired. Thus, no
longer only a ‘failed event’ should be signaled but also a ‘re-
paired event’. However, as mentioned above, we only need
to modify ‘locally’ the elementary I/O-IMC corresponding
to each DFT element behavior. Due to the lack of space, we
will only discuss the new I/O-IMC for the BE and the AND
gate (other elements are treated in the same fashion). The
repairable cold BE’s I/O-IMC is shown on Figure 13. Here,
µ denotes the BE repair rate and r! is a signal output by the
BE notifying, to the rest of the elements, that it has been
repaired. Note that the fired state is not absorbing anymore.
As an alternative model, one can of course think of the BE
interacting with a repair station (RS); in which case, the re-
pair process15 would be part of the RS I/O-IMC model and
f would also be an input to the RS. An extra signal (input
to the BE and an output of the RS) would also be needed
for communication between the BE and RS and signaling
that the RS has finished the repair. The repairable AND
f!a?
r!
Figure 13. The repairable BE I/O-IMC model.
gate I/O-IMC model is shown on Figure 14. The AND gate
has its own repair output signal (i.e. r!) and needs to con-
sider both failure (fA? and fB?) and repair (rA? and rB?)
signals coming from its inputs A and B. Compared to the
unrepairable AND gate, Figure 14 has 3 extra states. If we
rA?
fA?
rB?
fB?
rA?
fA?
rB?
fB?
rA?
fA?
rB?
fB?
f!
r!
r!
fA?
rA?
rB?
fB?
r!
Figure 14. The repairable AND gate I/O-IMC model.
consider a very simple repairable system composed of an
AND gate with two BE A and B (Figure 15.a), then the
resulting I/O-IMC after automatic composition and aggre-
gation16 is, as expected, a CTMC shown on Figure 15.b.
15Which could be more complicated than a single Markovian transition
with repair rate µ.
16And abstraction of the AND gate’s activation and failure signals.
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At this point, one can perform some analysis on the CTMC
A
(a) (b)
B
Figure 15. A simple repairable system.
such as computing the system unavailability.
8. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we have illustrated the use of the I/O-IMC
framework for the analysis of DFT and showed, through
some examples, the increase of the DFT modularity both at
the analysis level and the model-building level. We have
also demonstrated the ease with which one can define new
DFT elements and provided examples of such extensions.
Areas of future research include: (1) From a process al-
gebra point of view, we would like to achieve even more
drastic state-space reduction using more suitable aggrega-
tion techniques. (2) Generalize the concept of activation
to any type of mode switch17; this is similar to the notion
of ‘triggered Markov processes’ defined in [6]. (3) In this
paper, we have only considered exponential failure distribu-
tions for BE; it would be worthwhile investigating the use of
phase-type distributions, which naturally integrate into the
I/O-IMC framework, to approximate any BE failure proba-
bility distribution.
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